I
Differ in Part with B. J. Samukai's Security
Reform Proposals
Arthur
B. Dennis
At the All Liberian National Conference
held April 14-16, 2005 in Columbia, State
of Maryland, B. J. Samukai, Jr, a long time
friend who and I served in the military
with nickname "academic," presented
a paper containing a wide range of Military
and Security Reform Proposals not only for
the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) but also
for the entire civil security agencies.
Good job, "academic" but I differ
in part with some of the reform proposals.
Where
I differ in the Reform Proposals
Firstly,
I differ with the content of the proposed
reform plan. The Plan is overloaded and
too heavy to be implemented in this relatively
short period of time by the Transitional
Government. For example, the regional and
international exposure of our new military
officers through bilateral cooperation,
the re-establishment of the International
Military and Educational Program (IMET),
the Army Student Training Program (ASTP),
relocation of the Barclay Training Center,
changing the name of the AFL, the abolition
of the Joint Security Commission created
by law, etc. are completely outside the
mandate of the Transitional Government.
These are medium and long-term reform tasks
that should be reserved for the elected
government. The short-term mandate of the
Transitional Government as stipulated under
VII of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
is twofold: (a) To disband the irregular
forces, and (b) To restructure the AFL as
well as other Para-military agencies created
by law.
Secondly,
I differ with the way the problem areas
for reform were identified. In so doing,
Samukai places too much emphasis on the
failures of the AFL as well as the Para-military
agencies with no single comment on their
past accomplishments. Furthermore, he describes
the activities of the AFL and the Para-military
agencies in the war as if the entire service
members of these institutions are all bad
guys. It is unthinkable. However, while
it is true that some of the bad guys in
these security institutions committed unspeakable
war crimes in the conflict, there are some
good guys in there who came out with clean
hands in the war, as such, they should not
be indicted on the basis of collective guilt.
Their job experience and skills could be
used in the near future to train new service
members in the restructured military and
police.
Moreover,
let us bear in mind that in the years before
the war, the activities of the military
and Para-military agencies were not a complete
nuisance to the taxpayers. For example,
in 1960, the AFL served with honor on the
UN the peacekeeping mission to Congo; under
the Tolbert and Doe Administrations, the
AFL constructed roads and bridges; it built
public buildings and health centers; it
was involved in food production, etc. Similarly,
following the reorganization of the Police
under the USAID program in 1962, the Police
became very effective in professionally
maintaining law and order. Even under Samukai's
leadership during the course of the war,
the Police exhibited some remarkable level
of professionalism in the execution of their
duties.
Therefore,
it would have been fair for comment to be
made on their accomplishments as well as
on their failures so that policymakers will
be able to know where to carry out the necessary
reforms that will make our national security
agencies more responsive to the security
needs of Post-War Liberia.
Thirdly,
I differ with the inconsistency in the entire
Reform Plan. In some part, the Plan endorse
the need to restructure the military and
the other security agencies, yet in the
end, the Plan proposes Option I, Option
II, and Option III measures in order to
demobilize or discharge all service members
of the military and the police recruited
before 1971 and from 1971 up to 2003 with
no option for future re-enlistment. To better
understand my points, let me briefly review
the military science of demobilization.
The
term "demobilization" is the contra-positive
for mobilization. Both terms were created
to provide opportunity for the President
in his capacity as Commander-In-Chief to
deal with crisis situations, especially
in the event of war. In so doing, our National
Defense Law (LCL Vol. II) empowers the President
to increase the strength of the military
by ordering all able bodied citizens into
active duty to defend the nation. This process
whereby citizens are called into active
duty in time of war to augment the strength
of the military is known as "mobilization."
At
the end of the war, the very citizens who
were called into active duty will then be
honorably discharged and given certain lump-sum
benefits so that the military can return
to its pre-war strength. The discharged
citizens will then be placed on Reserve
list to be recalled in the event another
outbreaks of war. Thus, the process whereby
mobilized citizens are honorably discharged
at the end of the war for the military to
return to its pre-war strength is known
as "demobilization" or "downsizing
by demobilization."
In
military science as well as under Liberian
Defense Law, regular service members in
active duty prior to any war are not subject
to "demobilization." However,
if the circumstances demand that the strength
of the military be further reduced or downsized
to make way for new service members to be
recruited, the law provides that regular
service members who are eligible for honorable
discharge for long-service, physical disability
and old-age be given life-time retirement
benefits, while those with character deficiency
and bad human right records from the war
be dishonorably discharged with no benefits.
The honorably discharged service members
will then be placed on Reserve with an option
for future re-enlistment. This process whereby
regular service members are discharged to
reduce the strength of the military is known
as "downsizing by separation."
Therefore,
whenever the term "demobilization"
is used in reference to active military
service, it means reducing the strength
of the military by honorably discharging
mobilized citizens who were recruited in
the war by state actors. In contrast, whenever
the term "demobilization" is used
in reference to irregular forces such as
rebel factions, vigilante groups, etc, it
means completely disbanding the units of
unlawful combatants recruited in the war
by non-state actors.
In
our situation, the civil war started December
24, 1989 and ended August 2, 1997 with the
inauguration of President Charles Taylor.
But the war resumed in April 2000 and finally
ended August 18, 2003. Meaning, under our
law and the doctrine of military science,
those recruited in the military and the
Police before December 24, 1989 are the
regular service members who should be subject
to downsizing by separation (if need be),
while those recruited after December 24,
1989 are the mobilized service members who
should be subject to demobilization. Having
clarified these points, let us now analyze
Option I, Option II, and Option III proposals
as contained in Samukai's presentation.
Option
I: Persons within the Military or the
Police who were recruited either in 1971
or prior to 1971 with concurrent years of
service up to 2003 but not less than 24
years of service in 2003, should be demobilized
without option for future active service…with
payment of salary arrears up to June 2005….
In other words, Samukai is saying that all
persons within the military and police either
in 1971 or prior to 1971 should be demobilized
(apparent reference to discharge) and given
certain lump-sum benefits without option
for future re-enlistment.
I
strongly differ with Option I because firstly,
as I indicated in the foregoing, those who
were in the military and the Police either
in 1971 or prior to and after 1971 are regular
service members. Secondly, as I also indicated
in the foregoing, the term "demobilization"
does not apply to regular service members.
Instead, it applies only to mobilized citizens
and unlawful combatants.
Thirdly,
as far as the doctrine of military science
and our National Defense Law are concerned,
honorably discharged regular service members
are entitled to life-time retirement and
pension benefits, whether in peacetime,
wartime or at the end of a war. Only mobilized
service members (and at times unlawful combatants)
are entitled to lump-sum benefits. Fourthly,
I also indicated in the foregoing that honorably
discharged regular service members are usually
placed on Reserve list with option for future
re-enlistment if they meet the re-enlistment
requirements. Therefore, Option I violates
the doctrine of military science and the
Defense Law of Liberia.
Option
II: Persons within the Military and
or the Police were recruited from 1980 with
concurrent years of service up to 2003 but
not less than 14 years of service up to
2003, should be demobilized without option
of future service… with payment of
salary arrears up to 2005. In other words,
Samukai is proposing that those who were
recruited from 1980 in the Military or Police
up to 2003 should be demobilized (apparent
reference to discharge) with certain lump-sum
benefits without option for future re-enlistment.
Here
again I differ. Because those recruited
from 1980 up to December 24, 1989 are regular
service members who deserve statutory discharged
treatments once they meet the eligibility
requirements... Therefore, Option II also
violates the Defense Law and the doctrine
of military science.
Option
III: Persons within the Military or
the Police who were recruited from 1990
with concurrent years of service up to 2003,
should be demobilized… with certain
lump-sum benefits, including salary arrears
up to June 2005. Under Option III, Samukai
is right on target. People recruited in
the military and the police from December
24, 1989 up to August 2003 are mobilized
citizens and so they should be demobilized.
On
the issue of abolishing the Militia, Samukai
needs to be informed that since April 12,
1980, militia units have been abolished
in Liberia and replaced by Army Reserve,
Navy Reserve, and Air Force Reserve, including
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Militia
Units were first established in the United
States following the 1776 Revolutionary
war, and their role was to provide citizen
soldiers to the military in time of war.
But in 1908, they were abolished and replaced
by Army Reserve, Navy Reserve and Air Force
Reserve including ROTC. Although the Reserve
maintains the traditional role of the militia,
the term "militia" is no longer
in the dictionary of military science.
Concluding
Comments
Indeed,
Samukai made some comments on the reorganization
of the military and other security institutions,
but his proposed demobilization measures
under Option I, II and III seem to suggest
that he wants the entire military and the
police to be completely disbanded probably
to make way for a new military and a new
police. Here are the clues.
Firstly,
as I indicated from the beginning, Samukai
places too much emphasis on the weaknesses
of the military and police so much so that
any legal minded person would conclude that
he is building a case in an indictment against
the service members of these institutions,
rather than identifying the problem areas
for reform.
For
example, in the introduction of his presentation,
he said "Unfortunately, our military
and security institutions became brutal
instruments of human rights violations and
state sponsored acts of terrorism. Command
leadership became tribalized, factionalized,
and their actions politically driven…"
Commenting further on P.3 of his presentation,
he said "the constitutional rationale
under which the military was to benefit
from retirement and pensions did not anticipate
the brutal nature of men in arms, neither
did it foresee that personnel of our military
and security institutions would be involved
in atrocities as well as creating and supporting
warring factions, and violating their constitutional
responsibilities. The burden of proof herein
rests with the military and security organizations…"
Here, he is justifying why regular service
members should be discharged with lump-sum
benefits (not pensions) as contained under
Option I and II.
Secondly,
under Option I Samukai proposes that persons
within the military or the Police recruited
either before 1971 or in 1971 and up to
2003 be demobilized (apparent reference
to discharge) with lump-sum benefits without
option for future re-enlistment. Under Option
II, he proposes that persons within the
military or police recruited from 1980 up
to 2003 be demobilized (apparent reference
to discharge) with lump-sum benefits without
option for future re-enlistment; and under
Option III he proposes that persons recruited
from 1990 up to 2003 be demobilized (apparent
reference to discharge) with lump-sum benefits.
Now,
if all persons within the military and police
who were recruited before 1971 and those
who were recruited from 1971 up to 2003
should be discharged with lump-sum benefits
with no option for future re-enlistment
as contained under Option I, II and III,
it means at the end of the day, no person
will remain in the military and police.
Of course, in military science, the process
whereby military units and their service
members are completely disbanded in such
a manner is known as "demilitarization."
We believe this is exactly what Samukai's
Reform Plan seeks to achieve, especially
so given the interest he developed to quote
the World Bank Paper which states that the
transition from war to peace is marked by
the need to stabilize the economy and demilitarize
the country….
However,
perhaps Samukai needs to be reminded that
the Transitional Government was not mandated
by the CPA to disband the military or dismantle
any statutory security agency to create
a new one. Instead, it was mandated to disband
only units of unlawful combatants and thereafter
to restructure the AFL as well as other
para-military agencies. Even the mandate
of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) as contained
in the Press Conference held at the U. S.
Embassy in last February is to restructure,
train, and upgrade the Liberian military.
Therefore,
the gradual building of a restructured Police
involving the phase by-phase recruitment
as well as training and deployment currently
being carried under the Transitional Government
is precisely the restructuring exercise
needed for the AFL and other security agencies.
As such, we should support the Transitional
Government and the Security Sector Reform
with proposals that are directly related
to reorganization, rather than demilitarization.
THE END
